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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA SCHWARZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, STATE RECORDS 
COMMITTEE, EXECUTIVE 
SECRETARY ERIC A. STENE; 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS; AND 
VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH, 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAVID E. 
DANGERFIELD, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Case No. 20030875 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The parties are accurately and completely identified in the caption. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2002). By order dated December 4, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L Should this Court consider issues that Schwarz failed to preserve in the 
court below or properly brief on appeal? 
Standard of Review: Arguments not raised in the court below are waived. State v. 
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,1J13, 54 P.3d 645. If an appellant fails to adequately 
brief the issues, the appellate court may decline to consider the argument. 
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634, at 
*2 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2003) (unpublished opinion, attached hereto as 
Addendum A). 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that Schwarz failed to state a claim 
against the State of Utah, its agencies and its staff? (R. 80-81, 127-130). 
Schwarz incorrectly states that this is an appeal from a order granting summary 
judgment. This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting Defendants' Motions to 
Dismiss. 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion to dismiss is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness, "considering] only the legal sufficiency of 
the complaint" and giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Utah Safe 
to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ^11; State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,1(17, 70 P.3d 111; Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17,f8, 71 P.3d 
589. 
3. Did the trial court correctly determine that Schwarz's claim against the State 
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and its agencies is barred by collateral estoppel? (R. 80-81, 127-130). 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion to dismiss is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness, "considering] only the legal sufficiency of 
the complaint" and giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Utah Safe 
to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, f^l 1; State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,1J17, 70 P.3d 111; Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^[8, 71 P.3d 
589. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The full text of the following determinative statutes pertinent to the issues before 
the Court is attached as Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-403 (Supp. 2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 (1997) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute over access to government records. (R.90). Plaintiff, 
Barbara Schwarz ("Schwarz"), filed this lawsuit after the Department of Human Services 
("the Department") denied her access to records and the State Records Committee ("the 
Committee") initially denied her an administrative appeal. Id. The Committee 
subsequently gave her a hearing, which resulted in a separate appeal to the Third District 
Court concerning the same subject matter. Id; see Third District Court Case 
#010907201. Judge Frederick granted a dispositive motion in that case. (R. 90). 
Schwarz5 s subsequent appeal resulted in a Memorandum Decision from this Court. See 
3 
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah Ct. 
App. Nov. 28, 2003). The facts leading to both lawsuits are detailed below. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On March 9, 2001, Schwarz sent a letter to the State of Utah, Division of Mental 
Health ("the Division"), requesting that they provide her "with a copy of your 
correspondence, the letters, cards, e-mail, memoranda, notes, etc. that you received and 
generated in regards of me." (R. 90). Schwarz then sent a second letter to the Division 
requesting that they provide her with "all your records on me." Id. 
The Division's attorney, Dawn M. Hibl, responded to Schwarz's letters and denied 
her requests, asserting that she was not entitled to the name of the referent which the 
Division regarded as confidential. The Division provided Schwarz with the email that 
had been received from the referent with the name of the author redacted. The title, 
employer and phone number of the author were not redacted. (R. 90-91). 
Schwarz appealed the Division's decision to the Executive Director of the Depart-
ment of Human Services. The Executive Director of the Department affirmed the denial. 
Schwarz appealed the Executive Director's decision to the State Records Committee 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-402 (1997) and § 63-2-403 (Supp. 2003). (R. 91). 
Division of State Archives employee Richard Francom, acting on behalf of the 
Executive Secretary for the Committee, initially denied Schwarz's request for a hearing. 
Francom wrote: "From the information you have given it appears that the Department of 
Human Services has fulfilled your request and provided you with a copy of all the records 
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they have relating to you," adding that "[t]he State Records Committee has no jurisdiction 
over the Legal Services Corporation . . . ." Id 
Acting on the advice of counsel, the Committee reversed Mr. Francom's 
administrative decision to deny Schwarz an appeal hearing but, before the hearing could 
be held, Schwarz sued the Committee and the other defendants named in this lawsuit. 
Among other things, Schwarz claimed she was entitled to know the name of the referent. 
The Committee subsequently held a hearing July 11, 2001 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-403, which resulted in a written Decision and Order. The Committee found that 
the Division had properly classified the identity of the referent as a private or controlled 
record. (R. 91-92). 
Relying on Utah Code § 63-2-403(1 l)(b), the Committee ordered disclosure 
notwithstanding the classification. This statute provides that "the records committee may, 
upon consideration and weighting of the various interests and public policies pertinent to 
the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information 
properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the public interest favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-403(1 l)(b) 
(Supp.2003). (R.92). 
The July 16, 2001, Decision and Order specifically ordered the Division to allow 
Schwarz access to the referent's name on the basis that the "public interest is served by 
allowing Ms. Schwarz to identify the person who has provided information about her to 
the government" Among other things, the Committee felt this would be necessary for 
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Schwarz to correct any misinformation given to the government by the referent. Id 
The Division appealed the decision to the District Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-404. The Committee and the Division filed cross motions for a judgment on 
the pleadings. Judge Frederick granted the Division's Motion and denied the 
Committee's motion. (R. 92-93). 
On March 30, 2003, Schwarz filed a Notice of Appeal. On November 28, 2003, 
this Court issued a Memorandum Decision affirming the district court's judgment. 
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah Ct. 
App. Nov. 28, 2003). The present case was essentially inactive while the parties litigated 
the related matter.1 This appeal arises from the District Court's decision to grant 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, which were based on mootness, collateral estoppel and 
the issue preclusion doctrine. (R. 127-130). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should not consider the issues raised in Schwarz's brief. Not only does 
her brief fail to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, she fails 
to properly brief and analyze the issues. 
The trial court correctly determined that Schwarz failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Her claims against the State Records Committee and its staff 
1
 As previously indicated, this lawsuit arose from the initial decision to deny 
Schwarz an administrative appeal. The Committee reversed that determination and gave 
Schwarz the administrative appeal she requested. 
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are moot because Schwarz received a hearing before the Committee. 
Schwarz's claims are also barred by collateral estoppel. The central issue in this 
case - whether Schwarz is entitled to the name of the author of an e-mail received by the 
Division of Mental Health - is identical to the substantive issue recently litigated in 
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah Ct. 
App. Nov. 28, 2003). Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting Defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss, which argued that principles of mootness and collateral estoppel bar 
the present action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ARGUMENTS MADE 
IN SCHWARZ'S INADEQUATE BRIEF 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that appealing parties must "clearly define[ ] the 
issues presented on appeal with pertinent authority cited." Water & Energy Systems 
Technology, Inc. v. KeiL 2002 UT 32, n.2, 48 P.3d 888 (internal quotations omitted). "A 
reviewing court should not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." Id. 
Generally, "[a]n issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Smith v. 
Smith, 1999 UT App 370,1}8, 995 P.2d 14. 
As this court recently recognized in Schwarz's related case, "briefs must include 
citations to the relevant portions of the record, demonstrate that the issues on appeal were 
preserved, marshal the evidence supporting any disputed factual finding, and cite and 
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analyze relevant law." Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 
WL 22827634 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2003). Schwarz not only inadequately briefs the 
issues she raises, she fails to analyze the only issue properly before the Court - are the 
claims alleged in her complaint barred by the doctrines of mootness and collateral 
estoppel? 
In brief response to the issues Schwarz does raise, Appellees assert that the Order 
granting Appellees/Defendants' Motions to Dismiss conforms with applicable court rules 
concerning orders. More precisely, the Order in this case states that it was entered upon 
Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The Order was entered after 
Judge Fratto redacted Defendants' proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
because the Order was based on insufficiency of Schwarz's Complaint for Injunctive 
Relief and Supplemental Complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5; R. 1-8, 41-45, 119, 127-131; 
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52 ("The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions . . . . The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b) 
. . . . when the motion is based on more than one ground."). In the present case, the court 
found no cause of action. (R. 119 (Hearing Minutes at 10:56 - "The court states findings 
and grants the motion to dismiss finding no cause of action.")). 
Schwarz vaguely complains about the fact that three judges allegedly "recused" 
themselves from participating in this case. Although the record is somewhat unclear on 
this issue, it appears the case was initially assigned to Judge Young in May 2001. Judge 
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Lubeck was assigned the case in June 2001. It was then reassigned to Judge Burton in 
August 2001. No dispositive motions were filed by the parties until Judge Fratto took 
over the case in September 2002. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the Rules of Judicial Administration 
grant discretion to the presiding judge to assign cases. Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 
3-104(3)(E); High Country Estates Homeowners Assn. v. Baglev & Co., 2000 UT 27, ^ 
11; 996 P.2d 534; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-29(5)(b) (2002). In High Country 
Estates, the court held that "rule 3-104 grants authority to the presiding judge to make 
initial case assignments and to reassign cases when necessary. Rule 3-108, for instance, 
enumerates several justifications for reassignment within the particular context of judicial 
assistance." High Country Estates Homeowners Assn., 2000 UT 27, % 14; 996 P.2d 534. 
In short, "presiding judges have broad discretion in reassigning cases." Id; see also Utah 
R. Civ. P. 63(a). 
Appellees recognize that unless a justification for reassignment exists, a judge has 
a duty to retain a case until it is completed. The justification for reassignment in this case 
is not clear from the record. It is worth noting, however, that besides the filing of the 
Answer to the Complaint, no significant proceedings had taken place prior to Judge 
Fratto's assignment. Furthermore, no dispositive motions were pending.2 In light of 
2Schwarz did file several documents, titled as motions, notices and/or affidavits, to 
inform the court of the status of the related case before the State Records Committee and 
to protest various matters regarding the logging of her filings in the court docket. The 
first substantive motions filed by either party were Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, 
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these facts, it cannot seriously be argued that the reassignment of the case to Judge Fratto 
had any impact on Schwarz's procedural or substantive rights.3 
Granted, a "lay person acting as . . . her own attorney 'should be accorded every 
consideration that may be reasonably indulged/" Wurst v. Department of Employment 
Sea, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (Utah App. 1991). Courts, however, have generally 
allowed improper filings only when necessary "in the interests of justice to protect a 
valuable constitutional right" State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986). 
Schwarz's constitutional rights are not at issue in this case. She sought access to 
government records classified as private, exercised her appeal rights when she was denied 
access to a portion of one record and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claim. 
As in the other appeal, Schwarz's brief in the present case fails to address the only issue 
before the Court. Given that Schwarz's brief is so lacking in its analysis and 
identification of the proper issues as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
Court, it should refrain from addressing the arguments in her brief Department of Hum. 
Servs. v. Schwarz. 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634, at *2 (Utah Ct App. Nov. 28, 
which the State defendants filed with Judge Fratto on June 17, 2003. 
3
 Schwarz also claims she was denied her right to a jury trial. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-404(7)(b) states that the court shall review orders of the State Records Committee 
de novo, without a jury. Finally, Schwarz alleges that Judge Fratto had ex parte 
communication with the defendants. No such communication took place. Schwarz's 
false allegation appears to be based on the court clerk's notes regarding the availability of 
the parties to appear at a hearing on one of several alternative dates. A copy of those 
notes is attached hereto as Addendum C. There is no evidence that any of the defendants 
had ex parte communication with Judge Fratto concerning this case. 
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2003) ("If an appellant fails to adequately brief the issues, the appellate court may decline 
to consider the argument."); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(j) ("[a]ll briefs under this rule 
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings, and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters."). Schwarz's brief 
does not comply with this rule and should accordingly be disregarded. See Utah R. App. 
P. 240). 
IL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
SCHWARZ HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE 
STATE OF UTAH, THE RECORDS COMMITTEE OR ITS STAFF 
The trial court correctly determined that the Complaint fails to set forth a factual 
basis for claims alleged against the State, the Committee, or its staff. Paragraphs 43 and 
44 of the Complaint allege that the Committee "did not grant [Schwarz] any hearing" or 
"advise [her] on any further appeal rights." (R. 7). While it is true that Schwarz initially 
did not get an appeal hearing before the Committee, that determination was subsequently 
reversed on an administrative level. Schwarz received a hearing before the Committee. 
There is no dispute that the hearing resulted in a written Decision and Order. Schwarz 
participated in the subsequent district court appeal of that Decision and Order, which the 
Division filed against the Committee. Consequently, any claims Schwarz may have had 
against the Committee and its staff for not granting her a hearing were rendered moot and 
should not be addressed by this court. See Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. 2003 UT 51, }^ 132, 
82 P.3d 1076 (appellate court will not adjudicate issues when the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
SCHWARZ'S CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE AND ITS AGENCIES 
IS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
It is well settled that the doctrine of "issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of 
issues in a subsequent action." Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, 
f 25, 44 P.3d 642.4 Schwarz's claims against the State of Utah and its agencies arise out 
of the same government records request that was the subject of the recent lawsuit before 
Judge Frederick. That case was resolved on dispositive cross-motions. The prior action 
was dismissed because the court found that the Division's classification of the requested 
records was proper. Schwarz appealed. That appeal was dismissed due to Schwarz's 
failure to adequately brief the issue before the court. See Department of Hum. Servs. v. 
Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2003). 
While the basis for Judge Fratto's decision in the present case does not detail the 
specific grounds for granting defendants' Motions to Dismiss, it granted the Motions in 
their entirety. (R. 130). That motion argued that all of the claims addressed in the prior 
action are barred by issue preclusion. 
The four elements of issue preclusion are: (i) the party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
4
 Issue preclusion, often termed collateral estoppel, is one of two distinct branches 
of the doctrine of res judicata. The other branch is claim preclusion. See Culbertson v. 
Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, f l2 n.6, 44 P.3d 642; see also Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, f33, 73 P.2d 325. 
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presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ftJ5, 73 P.2d 325; In Re 
General Determination of Rights to the Use of All Water, Murdock v. Springville 
Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39, ^18, 982 P.2d 65. 
The first element is satisfied in this case. The same Barbara Schwarz who is the 
plaintiff in this matter was allowed to intervene as a defendant before Judge Frederick in 
Third District Court Case No. 010907201. Schwarz filed pleadings and objections with 
the Court after it granted a stipulation of the parties allowing her to intervene in the 
lawsuit (R. 94-95). 
The second element, that the issues be identical, is also met. It is not necessary 
that the legal question be the same in both actions, only that the factual issues be the 
same. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983); see also Berry v. Berry, 
738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987); Cooper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387, 390 (Utah App. 1987). The government records request to the State of Utah, about 
which Schwarz complained in this action, is the same request that was at issue in the 
related action. (R. 95). 
The third element, full and fair litigation, requires only that "the parties must 
receive notice, reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise them of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Career 
Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 939 (Utah 1997). The 
13 
prior litigation met this requirement. Schwarz participated in that lawsuit and responded 
to the parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings. Schwarz clearly had notice of the 
action and had an opportunity to present her arguments and objections to the dispositive 
motions filed by the Committee (as her co-defendant in that case) and the Division (which 
appealed the Committee's decision ordering the disclosure of the requested record to 
Schwarz). 
Finally, the prior action ended with a final judgment entered against Schwarz and 
the Committee, from which she appealed and lost. Judge Frederick expressly held that 
"the interests favoring access are outweighed by the interests favoring restriction of 
access to the referent's name. See Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(8)." Judge Frederick also 
held that "interests such as guarding against the invasion of personal privacy, protecting 
the safety of private individuals, and promoting candid referrals for public assistance 
favor restriction of access to the referent's name." 
All four elements of issue preclusion have been met; therefore, Judge Fratto in this 
case was correct in concluding that Schwarz's present action should be dismissed. The 
prior decision of Judge Frederick is binding upon Schwarz as to the classification of the 
requested record. There is no dispute that Schwarz appealed Judge Frederick's decision 
denying her access to the remainder of the subject e-mail Having fully and fairly 
litigated the substantive issue in this case in the prior matter, the plaintiff is bound by 
collateral estoppel. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's order granting 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. 
DATED this Z& day of April, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
HU£.& 
MARK E. BURNS 
Assistant Attorney General 
JOEL FERRE 
assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellees' Brief 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this £Lr day of April, 2004, to: 
Barbara Schwarz 
335 East Broadway, Apt 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Appellant Pro Se 
John Wunderli 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Valley Mental Health 
5961 South 900 East, Suite 420 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v 
Barbara SCHWARZ and Utah State Records 
Committee, Defendants and Appellant 
No. 20030324-CA. 
Nov 28, 2003 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable 
J Dennis Frederick 
Barbara Schwarz, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se 
MarkL Shurtleffand Joel A Ferre, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and 
THORNE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM 
*1 Barbara Schwarz appeals the district court's ruling 
that the Department of Human Services, Division of 
Mental Health (Division) was not required to disclose 
the name of a person providing a referral to the 
Division pertaining to Schwarz 
Schwarz made a request under the Utah Government 
Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), Utah 
Code Ann ^ 63 2 101 to -909 (1997 & Supp 2003), 
for all records pertaining to her that were in the 
possession of the Division The Division provided an 
electronic mail message that referred Schwarz's name 
to the Division for mental health services, but it 
redacted the author's name pursuant to a policy to 
ensure the anonymity of persons making referrals The 
Executive Director of the Department of Human 
Services affirmed the decision On appeal, the Utah 
State Records Committee (Records Committee) agreed 
that the Division properly classified the name of a 
referent as a "private" or "controlled" record, however, 
it ordered disclosure of the name because "the public 
interest favonng access outweighs the interest favonng 
restriction of access" See Utah Code Ann § 
63 2 40^(11Kb) (Supp 2003) (allowing disclosure of 
records classified as pnvate, protected, or controlled if 
Records Committee determines "public interests 
favonng access outweighs the interest favonng 
restriction of access") The Division petitioned for 
judicial review in district court See LtahCode Ann § 
63-46b-15 (1997) (allowing distnct court de novo 
review of final agency actions resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings) 
Utah Code Ann § 63-2 404(8)(a) (1997) states that 
"[t]he court may, upon consideration and weighing of 
the vanous interests and public policies pertinent to the 
classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the 
disclosure of information properly classified as pnvate, 
controlled, or protected if the interest favonng access 
outweighs the interest favoring restnction of access " 
The district court vacated the Record Committee's order 
requinng the Division to disclose the referent's name, 
after finding that "the interests favoring access are 
outweighed by the mterests favonng restnction of 
access to the referent's name " The court specifically 
found "that interests such as guarding against the 
invasion of personal privacy, protecting the safety of 
pnvate individuals, and promoting candid referrals for 
public assistance favor restnction of access to the 
referent's name " 
The issue before this court is whether the district court 
conectly ruled that the mterests favormg access to the 
referent's name are outweighed by the mterests favonng 
restnction of access The Division contends that 
because Schwarz has failed to analyze or adequately 
bnef the issue, we should not address her arguments 
See Watei & Eneixv S\<> Tech Inc v hell 2002 LT 
32,<[H n 2, 48 P 3d 888 We agree Schwarz's bnefs 
fail to properly address or analyze the issue before this 
court The briefs contain no citations to the record m 
this case, and no analysis of relevant statutory or case 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
law. 
*2 Although the Division also briefed the merits of the 
appeal, neither an opposing party, nor the appellate 
courts, are obligated to address deficiencies in an 
appellant's briefing. See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 
370,118, 995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is inadequately briefed 
when the overall analysis is so lacking as to shift the 
burden of research and analysis to the reviewing 
court."). Accordingly, briefs must include citations to 
the relevant portions of the record, demonstrate that 
issues raised on appeal were preserved, marshal the 
evidence supporting any disputed factual finding, and 
cite and analyze relevant law. See Utah R.App. P. 
24(a)(9). If an appellant fails to adequately brief the 
issues, the appellate court may decline to consider the 
argument. See Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1110 
(Utah Ct.App. 1995); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 
P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct.App.1987). In addition, rule 
24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that M[a]ll briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper 
headings, and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial, or scandalous matters." Non-complying 
briefs can be stricken or disregarded. See Utah R.App. 
P. 24(j). Schwarz's briefs contain material that may be 
stricken or disregarded by this court. 
Schwarz requests this court to consider that she is a pro 
se litigant without the resources available to the 
Appellee in this case. However, Schwarz has frequently 
appeared in the district and appellate courts in this state 
and may be held to the standard appropriate to her 
experience. Since 1990, Schwarz has filed no fewer 
than fifteen pro se appeals in this court or the Utah 
Supreme Court, as well as three petitions for writ of 
certiorari. We also note that this appeal results from a 
civil proceeding initiated by Schwarz. "When an 
individual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a 
matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro se 
status is manifestly inappropriate." Lundahl v. Quinn, 
2003 UT 1 UT 4, 67 P.3d 1000. Accordingly, Schwarz 
may "be charged with full knowledge and 
understanding of all relevant statutes, rules, and case 
law." Id. at H 5. 
Based upon the failure to adequately brief the issue 
before the court, we decline to address Schwarz's 
arguments on appeal and affirm the district court's 
judgment. 
2003 WL 22827634 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 406 
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ADDENDUM B 
63-2-403. Appeals to the records committee. 
(1) A petitioner, including an aggrieved person who did not participate in the appeal to the 
governmental entity's chief administrative officer, may appeal to the records committee by filing a 
notice of appeal with the executive secretary no later than: 
(a) 30 days after the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity has granted or denied the 
records request in whole or in part, including a denial under Subsection 63-2-204(7); 
(b) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(i) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401(l)(b) occur; and 
(ii) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following information: 
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number; 
(b) a copy of any denial of the records request; and 
(c) the relief sought. 
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the 
appeal. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), no later than three business days after receiving a 
notice of appeal, the executive secretary of the records committee shall: 
(i) schedule a hearing for the records committee to discuss the appeal at the next regularly scheduled 
committee meeting falling at least 14 days after the date the notice of appeal is filed but no longer than 
45 days after the date the notice of appeal was filed provided, however, the records committee may 
schedule an expedited hearing upon application of the petitioner and good cause shown; 
(ii) send a copy of the notice of hearing to the petitioner; and 
(iii) send a copy of the notice of appeal, supporting statement, and a notice of hearing to: 
(A) each member of the records committee; 
(B) the records officer and the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity from which the 
appeal originated; 
(C) any person who made a business confidentiality claim under Section 63-2-308 for a record that is 
the subject of the appeal; and 
(D) all persons who participated in the proceedings before the governmental entity's chief 
administrative officer. 
(b) (i) The executive secretary of the records committee may decline to schedule a hearing if the 
record series that is the subject of the appeal has been found by the committee in a previous hearing 
involving the same government entity to be appropriately classified as private, controlled, or protected. 
(ii) (A) If the executive secretary of the records committee declines to schedule a hearing, the 
executive secretary of the records committee shall send a notice to the petitioner indicating that the 
request for hearing has been denied and the reason for the denial. 
(B) The committee shall make rules to implement this section as provided by Title 63, Chapter 46a, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(5) (a) A written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the governmental 
entity's position must be submitted to the executive secretary of the records committee not later than five 
business days before the hearing. 
(b) The governmental entity shall send a copy of the written statement to the petitioner by 
first class mail, postage prepaid. The executive secretary shall forward a copy of the written statement to 
each member of the records committee. 
(6) No later than ten business days after the notice of appeal is sent by the executive secretary, a 
person whose legal interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding may file a request for 
intervention before the records committee. Any written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in 
support of the intervener's position shall be filed with the request for intervention. The person seeking 
intervention shall provide copies of the statement to all parties to the proceedings before the records 
committee. 
(7) The records committee shall hold a hearing within the period of time described in Subsection (4). 
(8) At the hearing, the records committee shall allow the parties to testify, present evidence, and 
omment on the issues. The records committee may allow other interested persons to comment on the 
ssues. 
(9) (a) The records committee may review the disputed records. However, if the committee is 
weighing the various interests under Subsection (11), the committee must review the disputed records. 
The review shall be in camera. 
(b) Members of the records committee may not disclose any information or record reviewed by the 
committee in camera unless the disclosure is otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
(10) (a) Discovery is prohibited, but the records committee may issue subpoenas or other orders to 
compel production of necessary evidence. 
(b) When the subject of a records committee subpoena disobeys or fails to comply with the subpoena, 
he records committee may file a motion for an order to compel obedience to the subpoena with the 
listrict court. 
(c) The records committers review shall be de novo. 
(11) (a) No later than three business days after the hearing, the records committee shall issue a signed 
3rder either granting the petition in whole or in part or upholding the determination of the governmental 
sntity in whole or in part. 
(b) The records committee may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public 
policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of 
information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the public interest favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(c) In making a determination under Subsection (1 l)(b), the records committee shall consider and, 
where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect 
privacy interests in the case of private or controlled records, business confidentiality interests in the case 
of records protected under Subsections 63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest 
in the case of other protected records. 
(12) The order of the records committee shall include: 
(a) a statement of reasons for the decision, including citations to this chapter, court rule or order, 
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation that governs disclosure of the record, provided 
that the citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information; 
(b) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access was ordered or denied, 
provided that the description does not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or 
information exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b); 
(c) a statement that any party to the proceeding before the records committee may appeal 
the records committee's decision to district court; and 
(d) a brief summary of the appeals process, the time limits for filing an appeal, and a notice that in 
order to protect its rights on appeal, the party may wish to seek advice from an attorney. 
(13) If the records committee fails to issue a decision within 35 days of the filing of the notice of 
appeal, that failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal. The petitioner shall 
notify the records committee in writing if he considers the appeal denied. 
(14) (a) Each government entity shall comply with the order of the records committee and, if records 
are ordered to be produced, file: 
(i) a notice of compliance with the records committee upon production of the records; or 
(ii) a notice of intent to appeal. 
(b) (i) If the government entity fails to file a notice of compliance or a notice of intent to appeal, the 
records committee may do either or both of the following: 
(A) impose a civil penalty of up to $500 for each day of continuing noncompliance; or 
(B) send written notice of the entity's noncompliance to the governor for executive branch entities, to 
the Legislative Management Committee for legislative branch entities, and to the Judicial Council for 
judicial branch agencies entities, 
(ii) In imposing a civil penalty, the records committee shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the violation, including whether the failure to comply was due to neglect or was willflil or intentional. 
Amended by Chapter 245, 1999 General Session 
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63-2-404, Judicial review. 
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by 
he district court of the records committee's order. 
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the records committee's order. 
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review. 
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served with notice of the petition in 
iccordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a governmental entity's 
determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (l)(b). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by either providing the 
requested records or denying the request in whole or in part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401(1 )(b) occur; and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and shall contain: 
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a 
prior appeal to the records committee; 
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that issued the initial determination with 
a copy of that determination; 
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the court shall allow the 
claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim of business 
confidentiality. 
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be in camera. 
(7) The court shall: 
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence presented to the records committee; 
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and 
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity. 
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public policies 
pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information 
properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the 
interest favoring restriction of access. 
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of 
the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of private or controlled 
records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections 63-2-304(1) 
and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records. 
Amended by Chapter 133, 1995 General Session 
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